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ABSTRACT 
The Comparative Efficiency of Public and Private Provision of Postsecondary Education 
in U.S. National Universities  
by 
David L. Talley 
May 2018 
Chair: Danny Bellenger 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
The research uses postsecondary education in the United States as a test case for broader 
claims of superior efficiency of production from private sector producers as compared to public 
sector producers.  Using linear regression and structural equation modeling on secondary data 
from 230 national universities, I provide evidence that private universities are more efficient in 
production of postsecondary education than public universities, and that the relationship is not 
mediated by competition.  Using qualitative analysis of semi-structured depth interviews with 
both private and public university administrators, I provide evidence that personal motivation is 
also not a mediator of the relationship, but bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency likely is. 
The research contributes to knowledge by examining and clarifying the explanatory 
power and boundary conditions of x-inefficiency, expectancy theory, and budget-maximizing 
theory in the context of higher education.  The research contributes to practice by offering 
guidance to both public and private university administrators on improving efficiency.  Policy 
recommendations are provided with regard to higher education generally, as are 
recommendations for future research. 
INDEX WORDS: Efficiency, Education, Public, Private, University 
  1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
In non-academic discourse, especially in discussions of politics or government, one often 
encounters the claim that the private sector is more efficient in terms of producing goods and 
services than the public sector.  The assertion is frequently made with little or no supporting 
evidence, which is unfortunate, because the academic literature provides mixed support for such 
claims at best (Goodman and Loveman 1991) (Pier Vernon and Wicks 1974) (Sav 2012).  Many 
public policy debates proceed based on this untested assertion, and potentially reach conclusions 
which may be inaccurate if the underlying assumption is incorrect, or which may only hold under 
certain conditions.  It is worth pausing to examine this foundational assertion before proceeding 
to larger policy debates about the appropriate role of government in production, or the wisdom of 
privatization as a tool of economic policy. 
Understanding if, and under what conditions, the private sector may be more efficient in 
production than the public sector has economic, policy, and management implications in the 
United States.  Although the U.S. is generally regarded as a model free market economy, the 
government still plays a significant role in the economy at the federal, state, and local levels.  
This is true not just in terms of providing regulatory oversight, but also in terms of production of 
both goods and services in direct competition with the private sector.  Examples of such 
competition include providing hospital care to the sick and injured; provision of incarceration 
and rehabilitation services for prisoners; production and distribution of electricity and water; 
provision of primary, secondary, and postsecondary education; road construction, maintenance, 
and operation; golf course operation; swimming pool operation; trash collection and disposal; 
letter and package delivery; and many others.     
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President Trump’s administration has strongly signaled a desire for the federal 
government to privatize portions of the economy and to adopt behaviors of the private sector to 
operate more efficiently. The administration has recommended the use of public-private 
partnerships to encourage private investment in public infrastructure to stimulate economic 
growth and help repair the country’s deteriorating roads and bridges (Levitt and Mulholland 
2017).  The president has suggested privatizing the nation’s air traffic control system, claiming 
this could lead to more efficient outcomes for travelers (Shaper 2017).  For government 
operations which cannot be privatized, the administration has created an Office of American 
Innovation to improve operations by closely consulting with the private sector (Furan 2017).    
Detecting the presence of a relative efficiency gap between public and private provision 
of goods and services and providing evidence of the underlying reasons for that gap could prove 
useful in improving the efficiency of the overall U.S. economy.  Armed with that information, 
public managers would know that efficiency gains are possible, either by having the public 
sector emulate the behavior of the private sector, or through privatization if the underlying 
causes implied that the private sector behavior could not be effectively emulated.   
In the arena of higher education, efficiency has received an increasing amount of both 
popular and academic attention.  As increases in tuition continue to consistently outpace normal 
inflationary growth, policy makers and prospective students are increasingly worried about 
college affordability and access.  This has accelerated pressure on universities to reign in the rate 
of tuition growth, and to do so without sacrificing quality.  Student debt is quickly becoming a 
financial burden for young graduates that threatens to overwhelm their ability to repay their 
financial obligations.   
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Understanding how to make a class of inefficient universities operate more like efficient 
universities would have benefits beyond just the immediate financial implications of saving 
tuition dollars for current students.  To the extent the trend in runaway tuition increases can be 
checked by increases in university efficiency, society benefits by preserving the concept that 
“college is worth it.”  A university education has long been considered a gateway to the middle 
class, and to the extent that view can be maintained, society will continue to enjoy the benefits of 
a well-educated population such as a more highly skilled work force, higher disposable incomes, 
additional income tax revenues, and reductions in social ills associated with lack of education 
such as poor health outcomes and higher rates of crime (Ross and Van Willigen 1997). 
Attempting to identify and explain the underlying causes for a hypothesized efficiency 
gap between public and private producers of goods and services is a very broad task given the 
large areas of competition between the two sectors.  This paper focuses on production of a single 
service as a test case for the broader assertion that the private sector is more efficient in 
production.  Specifically, the current research examines the provision of postsecondary education 
from national universities as a specific case of private organizational efficiency versus public 
organizational efficiency.  The current research is a two-stage study designed to address two 
research questions.  Stage one focuses on answering the primary research question; are private 
organizations more efficient than public sector organizations?  Stage two focuses on a secondary 
research question; why are private sector organizations more efficient organizations? 
This research contributes to scientific knowledge by providing evidence to support and 
clarify theoretical explanations of why private producers may be more efficient than government 
producers.  The research contributes to practice by illuminating aspects under a government 
producer’s control which can help increase efficiency.   
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.1 Definition and Measurement of Efficiency 
A useful first step in addressing issues of efficiency is to define the term.  Economists 
have historically dedicated effort toward the study of allocative efficiency, and deviations 
therefrom.  Briefly, allocative efficiency refers to a situation in which prices are truly reflective 
of the actual costs of producing a good or service, and therefore all the resources in an economy 
are utilized in the production of the good or service that is most valued by society.  Smith first 
articulated this concept in the metaphor of the “invisible hand,” (Smith 1776).   
In contrast, the concept of productive efficiency encapsulates producing the maximum 
amount of output with the smallest amount of inputs possible.  This concept is normally what 
people mean when they discuss efficiency in terms of public versus private production.  A 
competitive market achieves economic productive efficiency when firms are producing at the 
minimum average total cost.  Productive efficiency is closely related to technical efficiency.  
Technical efficiency refers to maximizing output with a given set of inputs, whereas productive 
efficiency allows the producer to vary their inputs to minimize costs.  Farrell authored the 
foundational work on defining and measuring productive efficiency (Farrell 1957), and he 
advocates that productive efficiency, which he terms “price efficiency,” is a superior construct to 
technical efficiency precisely because it accounts for management decisions regarding the 
appropriate mix of inputs to use in production.   
The proper definition (Massy 2011) and measurement (Kosor 2013) of efficiency in 
higher education have been the subjects of much debate.  Massy provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the conceptual advantages and disadvantages to several measures for both 
productivity and efficiency in higher education.  The ideal conceptualization of efficiency, he 
argues, should recognize that universities produce multiple outcomes.  The learning that takes 
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place in individual classes is an outcome unto itself, beyond the more easily quantifiable 
outcome of awarded degrees.  Kosor concurs that the multiple outcomes produced by universities 
complicate the measurement of higher education outcomes but extends the argument by 
differentiating between the teaching and research outputs of the university. 
Massy also points to the issue of controlling for educational quality as a complicating 
factor in defining efficiency.  Traditionally, researchers have either used the cost of education as 
a proxy for quality or have controlled for quality with more direct quality measurements such as 
performance on a standardized post-university test like the Collegiate Learning Assessment.   
Kosor summarizes the two main methods used for evaluating efficiency in higher 
education.  Stochastic frontier analysis is a statistical tool developed in the late 1970s (Aigner 
Lovell and Schmidt 1977).  Stochastic frontier analysis is an econometric estimation technique 
that attempts to model inefficiency as systematic error in the approach of optimizing producers to 
maximizing their input.  The method relies on the concept of benchmarking or comparing a 
producer’s performance to a theoretically possible efficiency frontier.  Data envelopment 
analysis is a non-parametric tool developed around the same time (Charnes et al 1978).  The 
technique is similar in approach to stochastic frontier analysis, although the benchmark used is 
not a theoretically possible efficiency frontier, but a “best in class” producer.  A third method 
uses regression based on the education production function literature.  Here, the analysis takes 
into consideration individual student characteristics to help explain their knowledge outcomes.  
This provides a richer analysis but focuses the individual student level of analysis. 
Despite calls for clarity and proposed national benchmark models (Powell et al 2012), the 
United States still does not rely on a single, authoritative source for data and measures of 
efficiency in higher education.  This lack of precise definitions and clear consensus on 
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measurement for efficiency creates difficulty in understanding exactly what factors influence 
efficiency. 
The current research adopts a broad definition of efficiency.  Spending per degree is the 
conceptual basis, but more specifically the measure of efficiency proposed here is core expenses 
per degree awarded.  This definition captures the broadest concept of economic productive 
efficiency for which data is readily available.   
Core expenses include university spending on instruction, research, public service, 
academic support, institutional support, student services, and other core expenses not otherwise 
classified.  Students select universities for a variety of reasons beyond instruction, so the measure 
includes other expenditure categories because universities must expend funds on research and in 
other areas to attract and maintain the faculty required to attract quality students and maintain 
high educational standards.   
Degrees awarded is used as the denominator in this operationalization of efficiency.  The 
advantage of using degrees awarded is that it is a broad measure of the output of universities.  
Conceptually, the largest drawback to using this denominator is that it excludes learning 
outcomes that do not result in an awarded degree.    
II.1 Factors of Production Influence Efficiency 
Broadly, efficiency is a measure of the relationship between inputs and outputs.  In 
classical economic thought, the only factors of production available to generate consumable 
outputs are land, labor, and capital.  The production of lasers, submarines, toothpicks, and all 
other goods and services result from the combination of different types of land, labor, and 
capital.  Therefore, the factors which influence efficiency within an industry will be context-
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specific to that industry, because different industries are interested in using different inputs to 
create different outputs.   
As an example, the efficiency of agricultural production is typically represented in terms 
of crop yield divided by land, farm equipment, fertilizer, and the labor of the farmers involved in 
production.  Efficiency in the production of tobacco involves pounds of tobacco produced from 
inputs of land, tractors and wagons, fertilizer and pesticides, and the labor of farmers (Abay 
Miran and Gunden 2004).  Efficiency in the production of rice is measured in much the same 
way; the only difference being the measures for crop yields and the specific types of land and 
machinery involved in production (Anang Backman and Sipilainen 2016).   
The production of cruise ship vacations is considerably different than the production of 
agricultural products.  The inputs for the production function of cruise ship vacations do not 
focus on land, but here capital plays a much more important role in terms of the design and 
features of the cruise ship, and labor in terms of the quality and number of crewmembers 
available to assist passengers (Gregoriou Gultek and Demirer 2017).  Beyond different cost 
inputs, though, there is no standardization for the output of services such as cruise ship vacations 
as there is for agricultural products.  It is possible to simply count the number of vacations 
provided as a measure of output but doing so would assume that all cruise ship vacation 
experiences are equal, and that the level of satisfaction enjoyed by all guests was similar.  This 
additional complication of defining and measuring output to capture differences in quality will 
be addressed later in the Methodology section.   
It follows that the factors which influence efficiency in higher education are related to the 
inputs and outputs of institutes of higher education.  With respect to inputs, compensation to 
faculty and staff drive most of the costs incurred by universities, especially for teaching-oriented 
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universities (Davis 2012).  Technology also contributes to the educational production function, 
although the promise of online education has not yet materialized in terms of “bending down the 
cost curve,” (Deming Goldin and Katz 2015).  Interestingly, large, private, for-profit institutions 
of higher education appear to have been the most aggressive in adopting online education, 
whereas public and private non-profit universities appear to have been more cautious in 
adoption, perhaps because of a perceived lack of quality in the education received through online 
delivery.   
The academic literature on the higher education production function focuses primarily on 
the effort and quality of students and the effort and quality of faculty and staff (Dolan and 
Schmidt 1994).  There is some theoretical and empirical evidence that the physical capital plant 
at universities is also an important part of the production function of higher education (Dolan and 
Schmidt 1994) (Hopkins 1990).   
II.2 Previous Research on Efficiency in Higher Education 
Powell and colleagues conducted an interesting study on the relationship between 
efficiency and effectiveness in higher education (Powell et al 2012), which serves as a partial 
model for the present study.  Their research points to a perception, especially amongst university 
presidents, of a trade-off between efficiency, effectiveness, and access in higher education.  Only 
reductions in quality or restrictions in access to students without financial wherewithal can 
increase efficiency.     
Building on previous research (Bowen 1980), Powell examined the hypothesis that 
universities follow the revenue theory of cost.  This theory holds that costs will expand to 
consume available revenues, in part because society has viewed education as a public good, and 
price signals in the market are comparatively weak.  One implication of this is that one should 
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expect to find radically different costs and levels of efficiency for different universities, because 
costs, and subsequently levels of efficiency, are simply a function of available revenues.  
Another important implication is that there is little or no incentive to reduce costs and improve 
efficiency under this model; the incentive would be to maximize available revenues and then 
decide how to allocate those revenues among cost categories.   
Research has generally supported Bowen’s revenue theory of cost in a variety of 
academic settings.  Leslie and colleagues found support for the theory amongst research-focused 
universities, especially among public institutions, which implies there are some differences 
between public and private universities (Leslie et al 2011).  Archibald and Feldman (2011) 
provide a counterpoint, arguing that the revenue theory of cost focuses too narrowly on higher 
education, and more general theories such as cost disease provide a better explanation for tuition 
increases over time.  Cost disease refers to the phenomenon of prices rising more quickly than 
inflation in industries where capital cannot easily replace labor.  Economist Robert Frank 
explained cost disease by noting,  
“While productivity gains have made it possible to assemble cars with only 
a tiny fraction of the labor that was once required, it still takes four musicians nine 
minutes to perform Beethoven’s String Quartet in C minor, just as it did in the 19th 
century.” (quoted from Bowen 2012).  
 This is likely true, at least to a certain degree, in higher education.  While this is a 
convincing argument, the focus of the current research is not the drivers of tuition increases over 
time, but with the relationship between the publicness of a university and the efficiency with 
which the university provides educational services.     
Powell’s team developed a model of higher educational efficiency and effectiveness that 
depicted these concepts as functions of institutional characteristics and expenditures.  
Institutional characteristics included size as measured by enrollment, Carnegie classification, 
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which measures the highest degree available for student pursuit, and the percentage of students 
receiving federal aid.  The team measured expenditures as federally reported core expenditures 
on research and instruction.  Class size, student to faculty ratio, administration to faculty ratio, 
teaching load, and faculty satisfaction were the measures for efficiency.  Effectiveness measures 
included first year retention rates and four and six-year graduation rates.  Powell’s model, 
depicted in Figure 1, will serve as a basis for modification to answer the present research 
questions. 
Powell found that, as expected, there was an inverse relationship between efficiency and 
effectiveness for universities.  More meaningfully though, the research indicated that 
institutional characteristics were predictors of both efficiency and effectiveness.  Recall that 
Powell tested institutional characteristics such as size and classification, but not the publicness of 
the universities. 
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Figure 1: Powell's Model of Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
 
This model requires some modification to address the present research questions.  First, 
there are two dependent variables in Powell’s model.  As I am primarily interested in efficiency, 
a control variable for quality will subsume the construct of effectiveness.  Secondly, Powell 
modeled expenditures as a driver of efficiency using several measures for expenditures based on 
aggregate spending reported by universities.   
I argue that expenditures per award are a broader, more appropriate measure of efficiency 
than are class size, and professor or administrator to student ratios.  Expenditures per award 
encapsulate all aspects of the educational experience that class size and ratios might ignore.  
Furthermore, it is better to use class size and student ratios as controls to help explain variations 
in expenditures per award than the reverse.   
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With these modifications, we turn to understanding some mediating variables through 
which inefficiency may be transmitted from the institutional characteristic of being a public 
university through to an outcome such as being less efficient in terms of spending per award.  
The academic literature contains three compelling theoretical explanations for why public 
universities may be less efficient than their private counterparts.    
II.3 Causes of Inefficiency for Hypothesized Model 
The production function for higher education, and for all other goods and services, begins 
with the factors of production.  For higher education, the labor of faculty and staff, and to a 
lesser extent the capital stock of the university in terms of buildings, equipment, and technology 
are all important inputs to producing higher education.  If the markets for all these inputs are 
approximately competitive, then universities should be able to acquire them for the same price.  
If that is true, then why would anyone expect public universities to be any less efficient than 
private universities? 
The answer is that while the production function begins with land, labor, and capital; it 
certainly does not end there.  Economists have long recognized that the way in which managers 
combine the factors of production has a significant impact on efficiency.  Smith recounts a story 
of remarkable gains in the yield of pins produced by workers simply by dividing labor and 
specializing in certain areas of production (Smith 1776), a concept which Ford later refined and 
exploited on a much larger scale with the advent of the automated production assembly line in 
the early 1900s.   
Just as managers can improve efficiency through new and innovative ways of combining 
the factors of production, so too can they introduce and encourage inefficiency by acting, or 
failing to act, in certain ways.  There are three strong theoretical explanations that could help 
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explain why managers of government producers might behave in ways which lead to less 
efficient production than do managers of private enterprises.  
Leibenstein was the first to formalize the concept that governments involved in 
production would not maximize efficiency (Leibenstein 1966) by coining the term “X-
Inefficiency.”  The fundamental argument was that it was the degree of competition that 
producers felt which motivated them to behave in ways that were efficient.  Government 
producers could rely on taxpayer subsidies to prevent them from having to cease operations, 
whereas private producers were subject to extreme competition which would result in their 
eventual destruction if they did not maximize efficiency.  The need to strive and compete, he 
argued, disciplined private managers to make the tough choices that governmental managers 
would simply not have to make.   
This argument is simple, elegant, and convincing.  However, contained within it are some 
assumptions and boundary conditions which may not make it an entirely satisfactory explanation 
for differences in efficiency between public and private universities.  First, because disparities in 
levels of competition drive X-Inefficiencies, the explanation only makes sense if public 
university managers perceive taxpayers will bail them out of inefficient decisions, and that 
private university managers feel that the market will punish them for inefficient decisions.  
Secondly, the argument presupposes that universities compete for students to a large degree 
based on efficiency, and not on some other characteristic such as perceived quality or reputation. 
The second possible theoretical explanation for a potential efficiency differential between 
public and private production comes from the field of psychology.  Expectancy theory holds that 
rational self-interest motivates (Vroom 1964).  Three elements precede motivation to act.  There 
must first be expectancy, which means that a person must believe that by increasing their 
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individual level of effort, they will be able to improve their performance.  The second element is 
instrumentality, meaning that a person must believe that by improving their performance they 
will be able to achieve a specified outcome.  The third element is valence, meaning that the 
person must value achieving the outcome, and perceive some reward after having obtained it. 
Expectancy theory can be a useful prism through which to view human motivation.  With 
respect to managerial behavior at public and private universities, the theory could help provide 
an explanation for an efficiency gap, but only under the conditions presented in the theory.  To 
the extent that public university managers are less likely than their private university 
counterparts to believe they can improve their performance in attempting to increase efficiency, 
to believe that their increased performance will lead to improved efficiency, or to believe that 
they will in some way be rewarded for their efforts if they are able to improve efficiency, then 
expectancy theory can help explain differences in efficiency.  This is only true to the extent to 
which there are differences between public university managers and private university managers.  
If neither group believes they can influence efficiency, or both groups are equally convinced that 
they can improve efficiency, then the theory does not provide much insight into efficiency 
differences.            
A final potential theoretical framework to help explain differences in efficiency between 
public and private producers is budget maximizing theory.   Like X-Inefficiency, budget 
maximizing theory comes from economics.  Specifically, this theory developed in the sub-field 
of public choice economics.  Budget maximizing theory holds that public sector managers do not 
simply lack an incentive to be efficient, they are in fact incented to be inefficient in production.  
This incentive occurs because the budgeting model for governments is often based on 
consumption of the previous year’s budget (Niskanen 1971).  This creates an incentive for public 
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sector managers to utilize all their budgeted resources in any given year to increase their 
likelihood of receiving additional resources in future years, regardless of whether using those 
budgetary resources in the current year results in additional output.   
If public university managers are attempting to maximize their current resource usage to 
maximize available resource in future years, one would expect that they will behave in ways that 
are less efficient than private university managers.  This would only be true in the instance that 
public university managers do, in fact, have their budgets set based on previous budgets, and that 
private university managers do not, or at least the influence of the previous year’s budget on the 
current year’s budget for private university managers is less than that of the public university 
managers.   
Figure 2 displays a general, combined model of the impacts of publicness on efficiency 
drawing from X-Inefficiency, expectancy theory, and budget-maximizing theory.   
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Figure 2: Model of Publicness and Efficiency 
 
 
 
The present research will subject the hypotheses contained in the model to testing.  Stage 
one will test hypotheses one, two, and three and stage two will examine hypotheses four through 
seven. 
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H1: The more publicness a university exhibits, the less efficient the university will be 
with respect to producing postsecondary education. 
 
 
H2: The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through 
competition for students.  Managers at public universities will perceive less 
competition for students than will managers at private universities.     
 
 
H3:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through 
competition for students.  The more competition a university faces for students, 
the more efficient the university will be.     
  
H4:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through 
personal motivation for efficiency.  Managers at public universities will be less 
motivated to make the university operate more efficiently than will be managers 
at private universities.       
 
H5:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through 
personal motivation for efficiency.  The more managers are motivated to increase 
efficiency, the more efficient the university will be.       
 
 
H6:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through 
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency.  Managers at public universities will 
perceive more bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency than will managers at 
private universities. 
 
 
H7:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through 
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency.  The more managers perceive 
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency, the less efficient the university will be.
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III METHODOLOGY 
III.1 Overview 
This is a two-part study designed to answer two related research questions embedded in 
the model depicted in Figure 2.  The first research question is, are private national universities in 
the United States more efficient than public national universities at producing postsecondary 
education?  The second research question is, which, if any, theories help explain differences in 
efficiency?  The answers to these questions will help researchers better understand the dynamics 
and boundary conditions of efficiency theories in the higher education setting, with implications 
for the broader economy.  Answering these questions will also help managers in public 
universities understand how they may be able to increase efficiency in practice.   
III.2 Stage One 
III.2.1 Definition of Measures   
The dependent variable under consideration is efficiency.  Recall that efficiency measures 
input per output.  The measure for efficiency in this research is Total Core Expenses per Award.  
As constructed, this measure is actually an indicator of inefficiency.  As core expenses per award 
increase, the university is expending more per degree, and therefor can be thought of as 
operating in a less efficient (or more inefficient) manner.   
Information was gathered from the National Center for Educational Statistics within the 
U.S. Department of Education.  This agency maintains the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS), which houses a wide range of cost and performance data for colleges and 
universities in the United States populated from self-reported information provided by 
postsecondary educational institutions in response to surveys (IPEDS 2017).  
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Total Core Expenses are the input portion of the efficiency measure.  Guidance from the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB) governs the calculation and presentation of total core expenses.  Core expenses include, 
and are reported individually for, instruction, research, public service, academic support, student 
services, institutional support, and other.  Core expenses specifically exclude expenses for 
auxiliary services such as bookstores, dormitories, hospitals, and other independent operations.   
Awards represent one form of postsecondary education output.  Awards are degrees 
conferred upon students for completion of academic courses of study.  The measure used for 
awards in this research is the total number of awards issued by schools as reported to IPEDS 
from July 1, 2015 through July 30, 2016.  The total awards data are aggregated from several 
smaller, discrete categories of awards including certificates, associates degrees, bachelor’s 
degrees, master's degrees, and various types of doctoral degrees awarded.   
The independent variable under consideration is the publicness of national universities.  
The definition of national universities comes from U.S. News and World Report, an organization 
that routinely provides information to the public on a variety of university performance and cost 
metrics.  National universities in this context “offer a full range of undergraduate majors, plus 
masters and doctoral programs, and emphasize faculty research” (Morse et al 2016).  National 
universities are distinct from other types of universities, such as national liberal arts colleges, 
which focus on undergraduate education and award significant numbers of arts and science 
degrees.  U.S. News and World Report also provides information on regional universities, which 
offer few or no doctoral programs, and on regional colleges, which focus on undergraduate 
education or associate degrees. 
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There are different ways to define the publicness of national universities.  U.S. News and 
World Report, the federal government, and the public use a binary distinction between public 
and private.  Typically, the distinction is based upon whether publicly elected or appointed 
individuals control and operate the university, as well as the source for most of the national 
university’s funding. There is a further subdivision of private national universities into private 
non-profit and private for profit, but private for profit national universities represent less than 3% 
of all national universities, and they do not report meaningful performance and cost metrics, so 
the study excludes them.  The binary nature of the distinction between public national 
universities and private national universities oversimplifies the concept of publicness.  This 
research uses the binary distinction of publicness as an independent variable, but also employs an 
alternate construction.   
Additional information from the federal IPEDS database related to federal, state, and 
local appropriations and operating grants as a percentage of overall national university operating 
revenue creates a more robust measure for publicness.  This creates a continuous index that 
serves as a proxy for the degree of publicness of a university.  The greater the proportion of 
governmental revenues to overall operating revenues, the larger is the value for the publicness 
index.  A similar measure for publicness was used by Sav (2012). 
Stage one also tested the mediating variable of competition.  Competition is the rate at 
which the university rejects applications for admission as measured by the number of 
applications and the number of admissions for the fall 2016 semester reported by universities to 
the IPEDS database.  This measure of competition was selected as it is the most readily available 
data on competition between universities.  Conceptually, other measures for competition could 
include geographic characteristics such as the number of competing national universities within 
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the state, or within a given area.  The measure used here is broader in the sense that it accounts 
for the fact that students can be mobile, and may apply to, be accepted to, and attend a university 
that is geographically distant from their home. 
Differences in efficiency between public national universities and private national 
universities may appear for reasons other than the publicness of the university.  For this reason, 
the analysis must implement some statistical controls to limit the impacts of confounding factors 
which may also be influencing efficiency.  The confounding factor most likely to influence 
measures of efficiency is quality.  The production of high quality goods and services typically 
requires higher quality, costlier inputs.  It is difficult to measure the quality of educational 
output, unlike other economic output such as iron or tobacco.  Therefore, measuring and 
controlling for the influence of quality on educational outputs is both important and difficult.   
Measuring perceived quality from the viewpoint of the students for which universities 
compete provides a logical point from which to begin.  If prospective college students and their 
families perceive that a university is of higher quality, they may be willing to tolerate a lower 
level of efficiency from that university in exchange for receiving what they perceive as higher 
quality output.  Higher quality output could mean that the educational experience leads to more 
certainty in terms of job placement after graduation, to a higher starting salary, to a greater or 
deeper understanding of their area of study, or any other subjective or objective criteria which 
the student values.   
Adopting this definition of quality, one broad measure that is available as a proxy comes 
from U.S. News and World Report.  This organization has, since 1983, annually published 
several lists and rankings that are available for use by prospective college students and their 
families.  The rankings contain summary and detailed information about several institutional 
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characteristics of both public and private universities in a format that is readily assessable, 
searchable, and understandable to the public.  Criticisms of such rankings appear from several 
sources, including from students, academia, and the government.  Critics point out that such 
comparisons are subjective and downplay important distinctions between universities that can be 
predictors of success in postsecondary education.  Despite these criticisms, many of which are 
valid, there is evidence that some students consider these rankings “very important,” when 
making decisions about which university to attend.  This is especially true for students from 
higher income families and those attending highly selective universities (Espinosa et al 2014). 
U.S. News and World Report scores national universities on a ranking system from zero 
to 100.  The score consists of a combination of metrics around graduation and retention rates as 
reported by universities (22.5%), undergraduate academic reputation as judged by peer 
universities and high school guidance counselors (22.5%), faculty resources as measured by class 
size and faculty salary (20%), student selectivity as measured by acceptance rates and ACT 
scores of entering students (12.5%), financial resources as measured by per student spending 
(10%), graduation rate performance which measures graduation rates experienced in excess of 
graduation rates predicted by spending (7.5%), and alumni giving rate as reported by the 
universities (5%) (Morse et al 2016).   
 As previously mentioned, the U.S. News and World Report rankings are not 
without critics.  Some of the constituent components of the U.S. News and World Report scores 
are available individually from the IPEDS database.  Additionally, there are other data available 
in IPEDS which serve as proxies for either the quality of incoming students or the quality of the 
university itself.  These measures can be used individually, or collectively, as an alternative 
quality control in lieu of the U.S. News and World Report scores.  This alternative quality 
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control measure does not have the subjective undergraduate reputation component, which 
provides additional assurance in the objective, unbiased robustness of the quality control. 
 Table 1 summarizes the measures used in stage one of the research. 
Table 1: Stage One Measures 
Measures 
Type Construction Values Source Data 
Inefficiency Dependent 
Variable 
Total Core Expenditures 
divided by Total Awards 
Positive 
values 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Publicness Independent 
Variable 
Governmental 
appropriations and 
operating grants divided by 
total operating revenues 
0% to 
100% 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database.  
Competition Mediating 
Variable 
Fall 2016 rejection rate of 
applications for admission 
to the university 
0% to 
100% 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality (Index) Primary 
Control 
Graduation retention rate, 
Undergraduate Academic 
Reputation, Faculty 
Resources, Student 
Selectivity, Financial 
Resources, Graduation rate 
performance, Alumni giving 
rate 
0 to 100 Data for 2018 
from U.S. News 
and World 
Report.   
Quality 
(Enrollment) 
Alternate 
Control 
Total enrollment reported 
for the Fall 2016 semester 
Positive 
values 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality (ACT) Alternate 
Control 
Average ACT score for the 
incoming freshman Fall 
2016 admitted class 
0 to 36 Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality 
(Indebtedness) 
Alternate 
Control 
Average cumulative student 
debt load of students 
graduating in 2016 
Positive 
values 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality 
(Scholarship) 
Alternate 
Control 
Average undergraduate 
needs-based scholarship 
Positive 
values 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality (Faculty 
Ratio) 
Alternate 
Control 
Inverse of student to faculty 
ratio for 2016 
0 to 1 Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality 
(Graduation 
Rate) 
Alternate 
Control 
Four-year graduation rate 0% to 
100% 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
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Quality 
(Freshman 
Retention) 
Alternate 
Control 
Percentage of returning 
freshman enrolled at the 
beginning of their 
sophomore year 
0% to 
100% 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
Quality (Tuition) Alternate 
Control 
Weighted average for in-
state and out-of-state tuition 
for all students 
Positive 
values 
Data for 2016 
from IPEDS 
federal database. 
 
Publicness is the percentage of university operating revenues in 2015 derived from 
federal, state, and local government contracts or appropriations.  The source of data for the 
measure is the IPEDS federal database. 
Inefficiency is total core expenditures per award.  The source of data for the measure is 
the IPEDS federal database.   
Competition is the total number of rejected applications in the fall of 2016 divided by the 
total number of applications. 
Quality is a subjective score from zero to 100, based upon graduation rates, 
undergraduate academic reputation, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial resources, 
graduation rates, and alumni giving rates.  The source of data for the measure is the 2018 U.S. 
News and World Report College and University rankings.   
Constituent parts of the overall quality score provided by U.S. News and World Report, 
and other factors, may serve as additional controls. 
Appendix A contains a full list of all 230 public and private national universities, as well 
as their measures for efficiency, publicness, and quality. 
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III.2.2 Data Analysis 
III.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The first step in analyzing the secondary data is to understand the descriptive statistics 
that summarize the variables under consideration.  Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the 
secondary data collected as segregated by the binary definition of public and private universities.   
With respect to efficiency, it is apparent that private universities expend more dollars per 
award granted.  Private universities expend an average of $197,097 per award, whereas public 
universities expend an average of $146,977 per award.  That means that on average, private 
universities are spending roughly one third more per degree awarded than are public universities. 
The variation in efficiency, however, is much greater within private universities as 
compared to public universities.  The range of efficiency for private universities is over 
$1,000,000 per degree awarded, whereas the range for public universities is closer to $350,000 
per degree.  The standard deviation of efficiency for private universities is over $186,000, 
whereas it is only $61,000 for public universities.  Even accounting for the higher mean of 
private university efficiency, the coefficient of variation for private universities is nearly 95%, 
but only 42% for public universities. 
With respect to the publicness of universities, public universities on average receive a 
considerably larger share of their operating revenues from government sources than do private 
universities.  For public universities, the average is almost 44% of revenues coming from state 
sources, whereas private universities operate on roughly only 11% of state funds.  However, 
there are some private universities that receive more than half of their revenues from government 
sources whereas some public universities receive as little as 14% of revenues from governments.  
This illustrates the blurring of the traditional definitions of public universities, especially as 
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public universities have recently experienced reductions to their state appropriations in the face 
of austere fiscal conditions.   
With respect to competition, there is a good deal of overlap in the range over which 
private and public universities reject candidates for admission.  Private universities reject just 
over 54% of applications for admission.  Public universities only turn away 35% of their 
applicants.  The respective standard deviations of 25% for private universities and 17% for 
public universities indicate that the variation of competition among the two types of universities 
are similar.  However, the most selective private universities reject 95% of applicants and the 
most selective public universities turn away 84% of applicants.  This is an indication that there 
may be some divergence between the two types of universities at the more selective end of the 
spectrum.   
With respect to the U.S. News and World Report quality index, private universities on 
average score more than 13 points higher on a 100-point scale than do public universities.  The 
average score for private universities was 58, and the average score for public universities was 
almost 45.  This means that private universities, on average, scored almost 30% better on the 
quality index than did their public counterparts.  This closely mirrors the 34% better that public 
universities did with respect to efficiency. 
Returning to the quality index, the maximum score for private universities matched the 
maximum possible score of 100 points.  The maximum score for public universities was 78, a 
full 22 points lower.  When ranking all 230 universities by this quality index, the first 21 
universities are private in the binary sense of that term.  As with the competition measure, the 
wide disparity in the maximum score for the quality index indicates divergence of public and 
private universities at the high end of the quality index scale. 
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That is borne out by the alternate indicators of quality.  Private universities enroll 
students with higher average ACT scores, place those students in classes with more faculty 
members per student, retain a greater percentage of those students from their freshman into their 
sophomore year, and ultimately graduate a much higher percentage of those students in the 
traditional four-year time frame.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Private Universities 
 
Public Universities 
 
III.2.2.2 Pearson Correlations 
The next step of the analysis is to examine the relationships between different variables.  
Bivariate correlation analysis was performed using Pearson’s correlation coefficient (Wilcox 
2009).  This measures the strength of relationships between variables one at a time, without 
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controlling for the influence of other variables in the analysis.  The formula for obtaining a 
Pearson correlation coefficient is given below: 
 
where 
x and y are individual observations of the variables within a sample 
x̅ and y̅ are the sample means of the variables 
 
Correlation coefficients measure the strength of relationships between two variables on a 
scale from negative one to one.  A score of zero indicates that the values for the two variables do 
not move together in any meaningful way, therefore knowing the value of one does not help 
predict the value for the other.  A score of one indicates a perfectly correlated or predictive 
relationship, where 100% of the variation in one variable is associated with variation in the other 
variable.  Conversely, a score of negative one indicates a perfectly inverse correlation or 
predictive relationship, where 100% of the variation in one variable is associated with variation 
in the opposite direction of the other variable.   
Correlation coefficients, like other inferential statistics, attempt to infer some 
characteristic about the population under examination based on the analysis of one or more 
samples of that population.  When using a sample to make inferences about a population, there is 
always the possibility that the result produced by the analysis of the sample will not truly reflect 
the actual relationship in the population.  To measure this likelihood, the result is subjected to a 
test of statistical significance.  Statistical significance in this context means that the chance that 
the correlation coefficient from the sample would appear because of random chance, and not 
because of a true relationship in the population, is less than 1%.  Stated differently, if one 
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continually drew samples of U.S. national universities and performed these analyses on them, 
only in one out of every 100 instances would you calculate a correlation coefficient of the given 
magnitude without such a relationship existing in the underlying population (Wilcox 2009). 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for several key variables.  Focusing 
first on the dependent variable of efficiency, there are three statistically significant individual 
correlations with other variables.     
Efficiency has a correlation coefficient of 0.586 with respect to competition.  Using 
Cohen’s (1988) thresholds for effect sizes, as modified by Rosenthal (1996), the individual 
relationship between efficiency and competition is considered large.  A large positive correlation 
indicates that efficiency and competition largely move together in the same direction.  Recall that 
efficiency is measured as dollars per degree awarded, so larger values actually indicate less 
efficient universities.  It makes intuitive sense that highly competitive universities would be less 
efficient, but as with all correlations we must be cautious not to interpret causality.  There is 
nothing in the data that indicates that because a university is competitive that it is less efficient, 
or that because a university is less efficient it is competitive.  The large correlation coefficient 
only means that these measures move together.  
Efficiency is also correlated individually with the U.S. News and World Report quality 
score index.  The correlation coefficient of 0.680 is even stronger than the relationship between 
efficiency and competition.  The magnitude here is just shy of the "very strong," category.  
Again, this makes intuitive sense.  High quality universities are likely to experience larger 
expenditures to attract and retain high quality faculty, which would be associated with higher 
costs per degree awarded.   
  31 
 
Efficiency is negatively correlated with the binary measure for publicness with a small 
magnitude coefficient of -0.188.  This means that lower costs per degree awarded are associated 
with higher levels of publicness.  The coding for the binary definition of publicness is a value of 
zero for private universities, and a value of one for public universities.  The negative correlation 
indicates that public universities are associated with lower core expenditures per award than are 
private universities.  Recall, however, that this is a bivariate correlation analysis, and so the 
relationship between the two is not taking into consideration other variables.  That analysis will 
come later.   
With respect to the continuous variable for publicness, there are statistically significant 
correlations with competition, and quality.   Publicness has a small negative correlation of -0.171 
with competition when measured continuously, and a medium negative correlation of -0.411 
when measured in the binary sense.  This is an indication that public universities are associated 
with fewer rejections of applications for admission than are private universities.  Anecdotally, 
many are familiar with stories of elite private universities where admission is very competitive, 
but these correlation coefficients take into account the relationship between publicness and 
competition for all universities studied.  The data include some highly selective public 
institutions like the Universities of Virginia and Michigan, as well as less selective private 
universities. 
Publicness also has a small negative correlation of -0.199 with quality as measured by the 
U.S. News and World Report score index when publicness is measured continuously, and a 
medium negative correlation with quality of -0.363 when publicness is measured in the binary 
sense.  This is an indication that public universities are associated with lower levels of quality 
scores on this index than are private universities.   
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Finally, the strongest correlation is between quality and competition.  The correlation 
coefficient there of 0.813 falls comfortably within the "very large," range.  This is even larger 
than correlation between the two definitions of publicness (0.809), which we would expect to be 
the largest in the set because both definitions purport to measure the same underlying concept.  
Part of the strength of this correlation is explained by the fact that the quality index contains a 
component which measures competition.  Even with this partial explanation, the relationship is 
still very strong.  This is evidence that much of the variation in the competitiveness of admission 
to a university is associated with variations in the quality of the university.  When this correlation 
is combined with the correlations between publicness and quality and between publicness and 
competition discussed above, there is some indication that public and private universities may be 
competing for different students.  If public universities are associated with lower quality scores, 
and public universities are associated with lower competition for admission, and lower quality 
scores are very strongly associated with less competition for admission, it may be the case that 
public and private universities are competing for different sets of students. 
Again, all of the correlation coefficients discussed only suggest that variables move 
together, and further only suggest that one variable moves with one other variable.  The "chain-
logic," used in the preceding paragraph to introduce the notion that public and private 
universities are competing for different students cannot be fully supported with correlation 
analysis because each relationship described at each step of the analysis pertains only to the 
relationship between two variables.  To simultaneously account for changes in multiple 
variables, we need to move from correlation analysis to regression and structural equation 
modeling. 
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Table 3: Bivariate Pearson Correlations 
 
 
 
III.2.2.3 Structural Equation Modeling and Regression 
The final analysis for stage one involves structural equation modeling.  Structural 
equation modeling is a form of statistical analysis designed to perform regression analysis on 
several latent variables simultaneously (Hair 2014) (Hair Ringle & Sarstedt 2011) (Hancock & 
Mueller 2013).  Linear regression is a statistical method of analysis by which the impact of one 
variable, the independent or explanatory variable, is measured on another, the dependent or 
explained variable.  The advantage of linear regression over correlation analysis is that linear 
regression allows for the analysis of the impact of the explanatory variable on the explained 
variable, while holding constant the values of other variables which may also influence the 
explained variable.  Unlike correlation analysis, linear regression allows the influences of 
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multiple explanatory variables to be tested on a single explained variable simultaneously such 
that the effect of each explanatory variable can be ascertained individually. 
Linear regression simultaneously estimates the relationships between one or more 
explanatory variables and a single explained variable by minimizing the sum of the squared 
variances between the individual observations of each variable and the estimated line that best 
fits the data.  The most general form of the regression equation is given as: 
y = α + βx + ε 
where  
y is the dependent variable 
α is the intercept 
β is the slope 
x is the independent variable  
ε is the error term 
 
In the regression equation, beta estimates the impact that each independent variable has 
on the dependent variable.  Unstandardized betas are presented in the units of measure for the 
original variables and indicate how much change a one unit increase in the independent variable 
changes the dependent variable.  When the betas are standardized such that they are presented in 
terms of standard deviations, they can be interpreted much like correlation coefficients.  
Standardized betas estimate the relative explanatory strength of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable (Freedman 2009).    
Structural equation modeling takes the advantage of linear regression over correlation 
one step further.  In linear regression, the influence of multiple explanatory variables can be 
tested on a single explained variable.  In structural equation modeling, multiple explanatory 
variables can be tested on multiple explained variables.  Variables in structural equation 
modeling can act as both explanatory as well as explained latent variables.   
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Four structural equation models were performed.  Two models used the binary definition 
of public as the independent variable, and two used the continuous definition.  Two models used 
the U.S. News and World Report quality score as a control for quality, and two models used 
several constituent indicators of quality as controls.  Model 3, which uses the continuous 
measure of publicness and the U.S. News and World Report score as the quality control, is the 
preferred model.  Model 3 is preferred because it has a continuous rather than binary independent 
variable, and because there is no multicollinearity amongst multiple indicators for quality.  The 
other models are presented to demonstrate that the results hold under alternate definitions of 
publicness with alternate controls for quality.  The estimated standardized betas are summarized 
in Table 4.  The results of all four models are contained in APPENDICES C-F. 
The results of these models support several conclusions about the comparative efficiency 
of public and private sector provision of postsecondary education in U.S national universities.   
III.2.2.3.1 Hypothesis 1  
With respect to hypothesis one, that public universities are less efficient than private 
universities, the model shows a positive relationship between the publicness of a university and 
the university’s core expenses per award.  That is, as a university becomes more public, it 
expends more dollars per award granted than its private counterparts (becomes less efficient), 
even after controlling for differences in quality.  Again, using Cohen’s (1988) thresholds for 
effect sizes, as modified by Rosenthal (1996), the estimated standardized beta of .232 in the 
primary model is considered a small effect.  The effect is statistically significant in all models, 
although the magnitude of the effect size varies across models.    
Standardized betas represent strengths of relationships, but there is also meaning attached 
to unstandardized betas.  Unstandardized betas are the estimated slopes in the regression 
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equation presented in Section III.1.2.2.3.  Since unstandardized betas are presented in the 
original units for the variables they pertain to, they can be used to predict values for the 
dependent variable given values for the independent variables.   
As an example, running a standard ordinary least squares regression analysis on the 
secondary data with efficiency as the dependent variable and with the continuous measure of 
publicness, competition, and quality as the explanatory variables yields the following regression 
equation: 
y = -$140,129 + ($1,535)*(Publicness) + ($629)*(Competition) + ($4,688)*(Quality) 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the unstandardized beta estimate for 
competition of $629 is not statistically significant at 95%.  For a full report of the regression 
analysis, please see APPENDIX G.   
One method for interpreting and testing estimates produced by a regression analysis is to 
use the estimated regression equation to estimate a data point that is already in the sample used 
to construct the regression.  If I substitute the average values for public universities in the 
estimated regression equation, I find: 
 
y = -$140,129 + ($1,535)*(43.7) + ($629)*(35.4) + ($4,668)*(44.8) 
or 
y = $158,374 per degree awarded 
The actual average efficiency of the public universities in the sample was $146,977.  The 
regression equation over-estimated the parameter by $8,788, or roughly 7.75%. 
Similarly, if I substitute the average values for a private university from the descriptive 
statistics, I find: 
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y = -$140,129 + ($1,535)*(11) + ($629)*(54.4) + ($4,668)*(58.1) 
or 
y = $182,218 per degree awarded 
The actual average efficiency of the private universities in the sample was $197,097.  The 
regression equation under-estimated the parameter by $14,879, or roughly 7.55%. 
The estimated regression equation can be used to predict values for the dependent 
variable given any set of values for the independent variables.  With respect to hypothesis one, 
the correct interpretation for the unstandardized beta is, "For each additional percentage point of 
operating revenues that a university receives from government sources, their operating cost per 
degree awarded will increase by $1,535, controlling for the influence of competition and 
quality." 
III.2.2.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
With respect to hypothesis two, which predicts that public universities will experience 
less competition for students than private universities, there is mixed support for the mediating 
influence of competition between publicness and efficiency.  The primary model shows a very 
weak negative effect of -0.10, but the estimated effect is not statistically significant.  The first 
model also shows a weak negative effect, and the effect there is statistically significant.  
However, models 2 and 4, which use the constituent controls for quality, both show a weak 
positive effect, one of which is significant and the other of which is not.  There is not sufficient 
evidence in the data to conclude that public universities face less competition for students than 
private universities.   
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To evaluate the unstandardized beta, I estimate a new regression equation where 
competition is the dependent variable rather than efficiency, and the independent variables are 
the continuous measure for publicness and quality.  This yields the estimated regression 
equation: 
 
y = -8.04% - (.01%)*(Publicness) + (1.03%)*(Quality) 
 
Again, it is worth noting before continuing that the estimated unstandardized beta for 
publicness is not statistically significant at 95%.  This is evidence to conclude that the data do 
not support the hypothesis that publicness contributes to competition.  Full results of the 
regression analysis are found in APPENDIX H.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the regression equation yields a non-statistically significant 
coefficient for publicness, we continue the interpretation by substituting the average values for 
public universities, and find: 
 
y = -8.04% - (.01%)*(43.7) + (1.03%)*(44.8) 
or 
y = 37.4% rejection rate 
The actual average level of competition for public universities in the sample, as measured 
by the application rejection rate, was 35.4%.  The regression equation over-estimated the 
parameter by 2%, or roughly 5.6% of the actual value. 
Similarly, if I substitute the average values for a private university from the descriptive 
statistics, I find: 
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y = -8.04% - (.01%)*(11) + (1.03%)*(58.1) 
or 
y = 51.5% rejection rate 
The actual average level of competition for private universities in the sample, as 
measured by the application rejection rate, was 54.4%.  The regression equation over-estimated 
the parameter by 3%, or roughly 5% of the actual value. 
III.2.2.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
With respect to H3, which predicts that universities which experience more competition 
for students will be more efficient, there is again mixed support for the mediating influence of 
competition between publicness and efficiency.  The primary model shows a small effect of .106, 
and the estimated effect is statistically significant.  The first model also shows a small, 
statistically significant effect (.128), but the second (-.067) and fourth (.136) models indicate 
small negative effects, one of which is statistically significant.  There is not sufficient evidence 
in the data to conclude that public universities face less competition for students than private 
universities.   
Regarding the unstandardized betas, we can use the same regression equation used for 
hypothesis one and interpret those results.  Recall that the coefficient for competition in that 
estimated regression equation was not statistically significant at 95%.  This is evidence that the 
data do not support the hypothesis that competition affects efficiency. 
III.2.2.3.4 Other Findings 
There are also several other interesting findings that result from stage one which were not 
part of the original set of hypotheses.  For example, the primary model shows a small negative 
effect of publicness on quality (-.199).  The other models provide similar support with different 
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effect sizes, and all are statistically significant.  This is an indication that public schools are of 
lower “quality,” and that holds true for both measures of quality and both measures of 
publicness.  Coupled with the finding that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
public schools face less competition for students, this evidence suggests that public and private 
universities are perhaps competing in two different spheres for two different populations of 
students.   
This notion is further supported by an additional finding, which is that the quality of the 
university has a very large effect on the level of competition.  The primary model shows an 
effect size of .813 between quality and competition.  That effect, and the large effect size, are 
reproduced in the other three models, and the effect size is even larger than the control in place 
between quality and efficiency (.640).  Quality goes a long way in explaining how much 
competition there is to attend a university, and the publicness of the university affects quality.     
The evidence thus far indicates that there is an inverse relationship between the 
publicness of a U.S. national university and the efficiency with which the university delivers 
postsecondary education.  The relationship does not appear to be mediated through competition.  
The model does indicate that there may be other mediating variables between publicness and 
efficiency.  To explore the mediating influence of personal motivation of efficiency and 
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency, we turn our attention to stage two and the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data.  
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Table 4: Structural Equation Modeling Results 
 
   Test H1 Test H2   Test H3 
# Independent/Control 
Publicness 
to Quality 
Publicness 
to 
Efficiency 
Publicness 
to 
Competition 
Quality to 
Competition 
Quality to 
Efficiency 
Competition 
to 
Efficiency 
        
1 Binary/Index -0.363** 0.085* -0.133** 0.765** 0.607**  0.128** 
2 Binary/Constituent -0.652** 0.527**  0.172** 0.907** 1.139** -0.067 
3 Continuous/Index -0.199** 0.232** -0.010 0.811** 0.640**  0.106* 
4 Continuous/Constituent -0.224* 0.282**  0.011 0.813** 0.977** -0.136* 
 
* Significant at 95% 
**Significant at 99% 
 
III.3 Stage Two 
Having performed statistical analysis on secondary data to provide evidence of a 
relationship between the publicness of a university and the efficiency of the university, I now 
turn to the question of why that might be the case.  The analysis in stage one did not support the 
hypothesis that competition played a mediating role between the publicness of a university and 
the efficiency with which the university conferred degrees.  The model proposed in Figure 2 
contemplates two other possible sources of mediation for the relationship in accordance with 
expectancy theory and budget-maximizing theory.   
The data required to test the mediating influence of personal motivations and budgeting 
models are not currently collected and reported in any meaningful way.  There is some scattered 
information available on university websites and in financial statements related to the budgeting 
process, but the data is very spotty and not useable for any statistical analysis.  Data on the 
personal motivations of university administrators are even scarcer, as by definition the 
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motivation for individual administrators is unique to the administrator and does not exist in any 
meaningful way at the university level.   
III.3.1 Primary Data Collection  
To collect the data necessary to better understand the mediating impacts of personal 
motivation and budgeting processes, a series of semi-structured depth interviews was performed 
with administrators and faculty at both public and private universities.  Semi-structured depth 
interviews allow the investigator to guide an information gathering discussion with the subject, 
while allowing the subject freedom to give rich, meaningful insights into the matter under 
investigation (Strauss 1987).   
A total of ten interviews were conducted in February and March of 2018, both face-to-
face and over the telephone.  Audio of the interviews was recorded, and the audio file was used 
to create a written transcript of the interview.  The written interview transcripts then became the 
artifacts which were the basis of qualitative analysis.   
Universities were chosen at random from the list of 230 universities examined in stage 
one.  Contact was made via e-mail and by telephone with a point of contact listed on publicly 
available websites for offices of institutional research.  After briefly explaining the research to 
the instructional research point of contact, the investigator asked for the name of a potential 
interview subject.  The only conditions imposed for participation were that subject had to be 
willing to be interviewed, and that they had familiarity with the university budgeting process.  
The ten subjects that agreed to participate were subjected to a semi-structured interview 
consisting of six questions, with appropriate follow-up questions or re-directions as needed.  
Before the interviews began, the investigator gave a brief introduction to the research, including 
the definition for the term "efficiency."  The questions encouraged subjects to discuss the relative 
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importance of efficiency at their university, the incentives in place and personal motivations to 
be efficient, the influence of the budgeting process on efficiency, and the views of the 
administrator on non-traditional academic calendars and non-traditional methods of course 
delivery, such as online learning, in terms of both their impacts on efficiency and the quality of 
education provided.  The complete interview guide used can be found in Appendix B. 
III.3.2 Data Analysis 
III.3.2.1 Data Description 
To encourage honest and forthright discussions during the interviews, subjects were 
assured that personally identifiable information would not be included in the research.  However, 
it is possible to provide some general overview of the interview data collected to provide context 
for its analysis.  Ideally, interviews would be conducted with university presidents or provosts to 
provide the broadest possible view of university budgeting, and to ascertain the personal 
motivations of individuals at the highest levels of the university administration with ostensibly 
the most ability to influence such a broad measure as university efficiency.  Practically, these 
individuals have enormous demands on their time, and are therefore difficult to gain access to.  
To partially overcome this inability to collect data from the highest levels of university 
administrators, the investigator interviewed a broad sample of university personnel to gain 
perspectives from different areas of university life.   
The interview subjects had experience in several different areas of the university 
including research, student aid, registration, institutional effectiveness, and academic program 
management.  Their experiences covered a broad range of university activities, including 
assisting students, interacting with the federal government, general university administration, 
academic program creation and management. None of the subjects listed their primary 
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responsibility as teaching, although three of the public university subjects and four of the private 
university subjects were either actively teaching courses or had taught courses within the past 
two academic years.   
Three interview subjects had worked at both public and private universities and were able 
to provide comparative and contrasting points of view for each type of institution.  Most subjects 
had been in academia their entire professional career, and the average time at the current 
institution was 12 years.  Only one subject described himself as being in the early stage of his 
career, most considered themselves in mid-career, and two subjects mentioned decisions or 
impending decisions to retire within the next five years. 
III.3.2.2 Word Cloud Analysis 
Using online tools to perform world cloud analysis has been recognized as a useful 
supplement to more traditional methods of qualitative analysis (McNaught and Lam 2010).  
Word cloud analysis involves transforming textual interview data into graphic form.  The size of 
words and phrases that appear in the graphic represent the relative frequency with which the 
words or phrases occurred in the interview transcript.  This provides a visual overview of the 
words spoken most frequently by the interview subjects, which may be thought of as a proxy for 
the relative importance they place on the concepts.   
Creating meaningful word clouds requires some data cleansing.  The author removed 
common verbal ticks such as “um,” “uh,” “like,” “so,” and “you know” from the analysis.  Also, 
some basic transformations were made to combine like words and phrases such as “student” and 
“students” and “efficiency” and “efficient.” 
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Figures 3 shows the word cloud resulting from the combination of all private university 
subject interview transcripts, and Figure 4 shows the world cloud from all public university 
subject interviews.   
The most striking similarity between the two clouds is that the largest, and therefore most 
frequently occurring word in both, is “students.”  Subjects from both private and public 
universities discussed the concept of efficiency from a student-centric perspective.  The subjects 
were not familiar with speaking of efficiency in terms of how the university was using its 
resources; instead they were thinking in terms of the time and effort students were expending to 
obtain their degrees.  Four-year and six-year graduation rates, which are outcome measures, were 
discussed as measures of efficiency for moving students through the university system.  This was 
especially true at public universities, where the degree to which “students” was the most frequent 
word was even greater than its relative frequency in private university interviews.   
Perhaps more interesting than the similarities are the differences in the word clouds.  For 
example, the word “state” appears with some regularity in the public university interviews, but 
not at all in the private university interviews.  The words “research,” "budget,” and “tuition” 
appear more frequently in public university interviews.  For the private university interviews, 
terms related to the structure of the universities like “model” and “mission" are more prevalent.  
Importantly, the relative importance of terms that indicate size were very different between the 
two types of universities.  Subjects at private universities were more likely to use terms like 
“small,” and “little,” when discussing size, whereas the most prevalent size term in the public 
university interviews was “big.” 
The similarities and differences in word clouds are brought into even sharper relief by 
comparing the ten most frequently used terms from each cloud.  For private university subjects, 
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the ten most frequently used words were “students,” “faculty,” “efficiency,” “years,” “college,” 
“going,” “really,” “money,” “mission,” and “model.”  For public university subjects, the ten 
most frequently used words were, “students,” “university,” “going,” “get,” “efficiency,” 
“money,” “budget,” “research,” “state,” and “really.” 
The fact that private university subjects used the word “faculty” more frequently than 
"efficiency," even though the questions coming from the interviewer used the term “efficiency,” 
but not “faculty,” implies that the concept of faculty is very important to private university 
subjects.  Based on interviewer observation of content and tone, private university subjects most 
often spoke of faculty in terms of resources that improved the experience for students, but acted 
as a drain on, and were often openly hostile to, the concept of “efficiency.”  That is why the term 
“efficiency,” appeared next most frequently, and toward the end of the list the terms “mission,” 
and “model," as in subjects describing that the mission of the university and model it used were, 
by nature, not efficient. 
Public university interview subjects spoke about efficiency as well, but even though the 
term was included in their questions just as with private university subjects, the public subjects 
only used it enough for the term to be the fifth most popular, as opposed to the third most 
popular with private university subjects.  This implies that the concept of efficiency, even during 
an interview about efficiency, was just not as much on the forefront of the minds of public 
university subjects.   
Word cloud analysis can help with beginning to identify trends in qualitative data.  Some 
early patterns begin to emerge with respect to the views of university administrators in general, 
but also some differences between the concepts that public and private university administrators 
emphasize.  All interview subjects were familiar with the concept of efficiency from the point of 
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view of students, but not from the point of view of the university.  Private university 
administrators were more likely to talk about the mission of the university and the model of 
education they used to achieve that mission, whereas public university administrators focused on 
words indicating diverse missions like “research,” but also on terms related to revenue and 
efficiency such as “tuition,” and “budget.” 
To confirm these trends, and find further patterns in the data, I turn to a more established 
and systematic tool for analyzing qualitative data.   
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Figure 3: Private University Word Cloud 
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Figure 4: Public University Word Cloud 
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III.3.2.3 Matrix Analysis 
Matrix analysis is another tool of qualitative analysis, which is useful for both coding and 
analysis, but can be especially useful with respect to identifying themes and comparing themes 
across subgroups (Ryan and Bernard 2003).  Figures 5 and 6 contain matrices that extract themes 
from the responses for private university subjects and public university subjects.  The first 
column corresponds to the topics introduced through the semi-structured interview questions.  
The second column contains representative quotes from interview subjects about the topic, and 
the third column indicates an overall pattern of the responses.   
Comparing the responses for the importance of efficiency at the university between the 
matrices gives insight into how administrators at each type of university view the topic at their 
institution.  Overall, subjects at private universities did not consider efficiency to be a topic that 
their administrations discussed frequently or emphasized.  There was some indication that the 
concept of efficiency had been gaining popularity and interest over the recent past, while some 
private university subjects expressed a clear opinion that efficiency in delivery of education was 
almost antithetical to their business model.   
On the other hand, public university administrators indicated that they heard the concept 
of efficiency discussed relatively frequently.  Public interview subjects were not able to articulate 
precisely what the university goals were with respect to efficiency, but the topic did come up in 
regular conversation.  The views of efficiency were context specific, generally with faculty 
members discussing the concept less frequently and with more disdain, but with higher level 
administrators focusing more on the topic and seeming more interested in understanding the 
metrics around efficiency. 
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Regarding the use of efficiency metrics and measures of efficiency, both private and 
public university interview subjects indicated that their universities collected or tracked at least 
some information about efficiency.  Neither type of university was interested in using their 
efficiency metrics to attract potential students, in fact some of the private university subjects 
again stated that marketing based on efficiency would be counter-productive from the standpoint 
of their efforts to brand themselves as a “high touch” university.  Public university administrators 
did mention, without prompting or direct questioning by the interviewer, that efficiency metrics 
can and were used for other purposes.  Two public university subjects discussed in detail how 
efficiency measures were used during discussions with the state legislature, and one mentioned 
that the university president and members of the board of trustees were interested in efficiency 
metrics. 
Regarding the influence of budgeting on efficiency, the private university subjects did not 
indicate that the budgeting process had a great deal of impact on efficiency.  For the most part, 
budgeting did seem to be based on previous year budgets, but several subjects indicated that 
other factors played a role and the relationship between budgeting and efficiency was weak.   
Public university administrators, on the hand, were clear that the budgeting process was a 
disincentive to behaving efficiently.  The term “use it or lose it,” was brought up more than once, 
and one subject indicated employees would go on a “spending spree” as they approached the end 
of a budget year.  This problem was exacerbated by a lot of cross-subsidizing between budgetary 
units in the form of indirect cost allocations to and from a central budgeting unit, to the point that 
it was not clear what units were operating efficiently and which were not.   
Public administrators did indicate that there had been a shift over the past ten years 
toward a more de-centralized budgeting process, but in one instance the subject indicated that 
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this was more of a cyclical change than a linear movement toward decentralization.  At least one 
public administrator also indicated that the university was moving toward a more “student 
outcome-based budgeting model,” although the administrator was not clear on how student 
outcomes were to be measured or how the budgeting shift would be implemented. 
To understand the use of one possible tool to increase efficiency, the interviewer asked 
private and public university subjects about their university’s adoption of non-traditional 
academic calendars and/or non-traditional methods of course delivery such as online or distance 
learning programs.  The questioning centered around not only their use of non-traditional 
instruction methods, but also their thoughts on whether the use of non-traditional course delivery 
would constitute a degradation in the quality of the educational experience. 
Private university subjects indicated, for the most part, that they had begun to adopt some 
forms of non-traditional academic calendars such as more instruction during the summer, but by 
and large they were resistant to online and distance learning.  The private university subjects 
expressed that online and distance learning did represent a lower level of educational quality than 
in-person instruction, but more broadly they perceived resistance to online instruction at their 
university as more “not a fit” for their model of instruction.  Words like “tradition,” “model,” 
and “our way of doing business,” were prevalent during these portions of the interviews. 
Public university subjects expressed a much greater willingness to adopt both non-
traditional academic calendars and especially non-traditional methods of course delivery.  Two 
public university subjects spoke of non-traditional course delivery almost as points of pride.  One 
subject indicated “We are really progressive,” in terms of delivering online and distance 
learning, and another stated that “We have really leaned into that.”  Public university subjects 
also exhibited the sentiment that online course delivery could result in a loss of educational 
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quality, but they were more nuanced in their reservations.  Three public university subjects 
indicated that the type of instruction was the key to whether the course could be delivered online 
without a loss in quality.  Subjects such as mathematics and chemistry which lend themselves to 
a more lecture-style learning environment were thought to be good candidates for online 
learning, whereas seminar or participation-based learning were thought to be poor candidates. 
III.3.2.4 Other Qualitative Insights 
Aside from the trends identified by the word cloud analysis and refined in the matrix 
analysis, some additional patterns emerged from the interviews overall which were not directly 
related to questions in the interview or to the concepts contained in the hypothesized model of 
efficiency.  Three main patterns emerged spontaneously throughout the interview process and 
were common across both types of interview subjects. 
First, as partially discussed earlier, interview subjects were not particularly familiar with 
thinking of efficiency in terms of the university, as opposed to in terms of the student as they 
moved through the university.  When subjects began to think more deeply about efficiency from 
the standpoint of the university, they began to make distinctions between the efficiency of the 
university in terms of day-to-day operations, and the efficiency of the university with respect to 
delivering education.  Subjects agreed that concepts such as dining operations, building 
maintenance, landscaping, and other operational aspects of the university were subject to 
pressures for efficiency.  The way in which the university was organized academically and the 
way in which the university delivered education were thought to be outside the realm of 
efficiency considerations.  The subjects’ responses implied that attempting to apply efficiency to 
the academic aspects of the university would be thought of as crude or counterproductive, 
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whereas focusing on efficiency in daily operations was accepted and encouraged as part of being 
good stewards of students’ tuition dollars. 
Related to the first point, when discussing the efficiency of daily operations, two private 
university subjects and three public university subjects used the term “sustainability” in lieu of 
efficiency.  All these subjects interpreted efforts at sustainability to be euphemisms for 
operational efficiency but packaged in such a way as to be more attractive to outside 
stakeholders.  Subject eight told an entire story that lasted nearly four minutes about how the 
university had saved several million dollars in landscaping and watering costs by changing to 
hardscaping, but specifically did not emphasize the cost savings when discussing their “green 
initiatives.”  The same was true from subject three, who told a story about eliminating trays in 
the cafeteria, forcing students to make multiple trips to carry all their food.  The university 
highlighted the fact that less soap and water were used since there was no longer a need to wash 
trays but did not advertise the fact that students were now eating less because of the change, and 
so food costs had gone down while the price of a meal plan had not.  Again, the undercurrent of 
the stories was that it was somehow distasteful to discuss efficiency for its own sake.   
Finally, a stray pattern emerged concerning confusing the size of the university with the 
publicness of a university.  The beginning of this pattern was identified in the word cloud 
analysis but was clearly touched upon by multiple subjects in their interviews even beyond the 
extent of the relative size of the words in the word clouds.  The subjects routinely used “small” 
to mean “private,” and “large,” to mean “public.”  This is best illustrated by an interaction with 
subject three, who currently works at a large public university, but had previously worked at a 
small, private liberal arts university.  Proper nouns are redacted for privacy, and italics is added 
for emphasis.  Also, like most other subjects, subject three here assumes that my findings in 
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stage one, which were discussed generally before the interview, had found public universities to 
be more efficient than private ones.   
Interviewer: “You mentioned previously that you worked for a private university 
before your current position.  Can you tell me a little about how private 
universities view efficiency differently than public universities?” 
 
Subject 3:  “So, prior to (current university), I was at (previous university).  I think 
the smaller liberal arts schools tend not to do nearly as good a job as the 
bigger state schools in terms of efficiency.  They just do not measure or 
care about it as much.  It is not a concern of theirs.” 
 
III.3.2.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
Recall that there was evidence from stage one to support the hypothesis that private 
universities are more efficient than public universities, but there was not sufficient evidence to 
support hypotheses that this relationship was mediated through competition.  The matrix analysis 
in stage two provides some additional insight into why private universities may be more 
efficient.   
As discussed below under hypothesis six, the budgeting model of the university may be 
playing a role.  Beyond budgeting though, the concept of efficiency just did not seem to be at the 
forefront of public university subjects' minds.  This was also true of private university interview 
subjects, but the concept was even more remote from the forefront for public university subjects 
than for private university subjects. 
When public university managers did begin to speak about efficiency, they often spoke 
very narrowly about areas with which they were familiar.  That was true even of the more senior 
level public university subjects interviewed.  Recall also that some interview subjects used the 
terms "public" and "large" interchangeably, and "private" and "small" interchangeably.  Finally, 
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recall that public university subjects discussed centralized budgeting and cross-subsidization of 
units across campus.   
Together, these points may help explain why private universities are more efficient than 
public universities.  It may be the case that public universities are so large, and unfocused on 
efficiency, and so narrowly focused on budget units which are cross-subsidizing one another, 
that they may be experiencing some diseconomies of scale.  Rather than enjoying the benefits of 
spreading fixed costs over a larger number of students, it may be the case that these universities 
become so large and difficult to manage from an overall point of view, that individual units make 
decisions that ultimately lead to less efficiency at the university level. 
III.3.2.4.2 Hypothesis 4 
There is not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that managers at public 
universities are less motivated to act in efficient ways than are managers in private universities.  
Neither public nor private university administrators could readily think of incentives that their 
universities had put in place to increase efficiency.  This question tended to bring the interviews 
almost to a standstill.  It took a good deal of mental effort for the subjects to understand what 
was being asked, and even after providing examples of possible incentives that could be put in 
place, almost no subject was able to come with an example at their university.  Only one of the 
ten subjects was finally able to offer that he had received an extra $100 in return for attending a 
health screening, and that example took him nearly one minute to recall.  Either universities are 
not implementing incentives for efficient behavior, or if they are, they are doing an ineffective 
job of communicating those efforts to employees.   
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III.3.2.4.3 Hypothesis 5 
The data do not provide evidence that managers who are more motivated to behave in 
efficient ways increase the efficiency of their universities.  There was little to no variation in the 
level of motivation for personal efficiency, either as measured by university incentives in place, 
or in terms of other general topics raised by interview subjects during the interviews.  More 
variation is needed in the level of personal motivation before meaningful conclusions may be 
drawn concerning the impact of motivation on efficiency. 
III.3.2.4.4 Hypothesis 6 
There is evidence to support hypothesis six, which indicated that public university 
managers would perceive more bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency.  While private 
university managers were somewhat ambiguous in their responses, public university managers 
clearly signaled that centralized budgeting and a “use it or lose it,” mentality encouraged 
officials to act in inefficient ways.   
Perhaps more importantly though, the budgeting process was also revealed as a source of 
masking which units were efficient and which were not based.  Heavy use of indirect cost 
allocations and centralized budgeting processes in public universities mean that it is difficult for 
managers to grasp an overall view of efficiency, and to easily identify which units are efficient 
and which are not.   
While this same pattern may be true to a certain extent in private universities, it was not 
mentioned by any private university interview subjects.  This indicates that the pattern is either 
not present, or possibly present but not as prevalent at private universities.   
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III.3.2.4.5 Hypothesis 7 
While there is no direct evidence to support the hypothesis that employees with less 
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency will cause their universities to operate in a more 
efficient manner, there is indirect evidence that indicates this is a likely mediator for the 
relationship between publicness and efficiency.  The evidence from hypothesis one indicates that 
public universities are less efficient than private universities, and the evidence from hypothesis 
six indicates that public university managers experience more bureaucratic motivation for 
inefficiency.  The combination of these sets of evidence suggest that bureaucratic motivation for 
inefficiency is a prime candidate to help explain the relationship between publicness and 
efficiency. 
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Figure 5: Private University Matrix Analysis 
Topic Representative Private University Quotes Private University Theme 
Importance 
of 
Efficiency 
“I was the only one that really gave much thought to that sort of concept.”  “I think it’s 
something we talk about a lot.”  “I’d say it depends on the situation…on the 
operational side it is very important…but on the academic side, not at all.”  “We are 
thoughtful of how we use resources now, but ten years ago not at all.”  “I would phrase 
it as, we don’t worry about inefficiency, because it’s part of our business model.” 
Little to no emphasis on 
efficiency, although there has 
been increased focus there 
over the past ten years. 
Use of 
Efficiency 
Metrics 
“We measure a lot.”  “We do not directly market to students on efficiency, although we 
do so indirectly.”  “It does not help attract students.”  “This is a high touch country 
club type of school, efficiency would not be something we would promote to students.  
Their parents are driving the equivalent of two Lexus’ off a cliff each year to send them 
here.”   
Not used in marketing 
material to attract potential 
students. 
Impact of 
Budget 
Process 
“The budget matters, and it matters a great deal, but only on the operational side.”  
“Budgets are largely based on what we spent last year.”  “I have never worried about 
the budget process, because we have the luxury of being able to fundraise almost at 
will.”   
The budget process does not 
incentivize efficiency and 
may work as a disincentive to 
efficiency. 
Incentives / 
Motivation 
“There wasn’t anything direct.”  “I know what you’re talking about, but that is not 
something we have done that I’m aware of.”  “We do not have an incentive structure 
like what you are talking about.”   
There are no formal or 
informal incentives in place to 
reward efficient behavior. 
Non-
Traditional 
Instruction 
“We are a very traditional school.”  “That is not what we do.  We will not even accept 
transfer credits from an online university.”  “There is active resistance to that.”  “We 
have started to move ever so slightly toward more classes in the summer, but as to 
online or distance learning, there has been no movement in that direction and I can’t 
see it happening in the foreseeable future.”   
Very little support for non-
traditional academic 
calendars, and no support for 
non-traditional methods of 
course delivery. 
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Figure 6: Public University Matrix Analysis 
Topic Representative Public University Quotes Public University Theme 
Importance 
of 
Efficiency 
“I think it's something we talk about more.  It has been more of a focus in recent years 
with budget cuts from the state.”  “I think people do pay attention to it, but more at a 
student level and it depends on who you are talking to.”  “Faculty do not really pay 
attention, but for those in other roles it varies.”  “I hear it discussed from time to time.” 
The topic is discussed in 
general terms, but it is very 
context dependent. 
Use of 
Efficiency 
Metrics 
“You talk about efficiency, but that is also part of sustainability…that is good public 
relations, so they are going to market that.”  “Efficiency, no, I’ve never seen that in the 
marketing materials…we market on student experience and football.”  “We don’t 
market it to students…but it would be something we would discuss with the 
legislature.”  “It would not be included in marketing…but would be used by 
administration.” 
Not used in marketing 
material to attract potential 
students, but useful for other 
purposes. 
Impact of 
Budget 
Process 
“This is how much we spent last year, and we need to spend it because if we don’t, 
we’ll get less next year.”  “The budget model is changing to more of a focus on student 
success.”  “If the facilities people had money in the month of May, they would go on a 
spending spree.”  “It’s use it or lose it.”  “More of the money, instead of being 
centralized, is kind of doled out so there is a little bit more discretion among units.”  “I 
don’t know of any incentives to come in under budget.” 
There are some strong 
disincentives to efficiency, 
although that is changing or 
somewhat mitigated through 
shifts toward de-centralization 
or outcome-based budgeting. 
Incentives / 
Motivation 
“If you participate in a health screening, they give you $100.”  “I can’t think of any 
specific examples.”  I’ve worked at a few places that do that, not here, I can’t think of 
one.”  “I don’t know of anything off the top of my head…there are resources like lean 
six sigma for them to use, but no incentives.”  “The answer is no, and the problem is 
the accounting system makes it hard to tell how efficient you are.”  “No, not that I’m 
aware of.” 
There are few or no incentives 
in place to reward efficient 
behavior. 
Non-
Traditional 
Instruction 
“We offer a lot of instruction at non-traditional times, and some online and distance 
learning.”  “I think we’re pretty progressive…we have an online college.”  “Yes, we’re 
very interested in that.”  “We offer distance learning, although there is some debate as 
to the quality of the educational experience.”  “We have several online and distance 
learning courses and programs.” 
Wide support for non-
traditional calendars and non-
traditional instruction, but not 
at the expense of quality. 
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IV DISCUSSION 
IV.1 Conclusions 
The model set forth in Figure 2 contained seven hypotheses.  Using the combined 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, I am now able to draw some conclusions regarding some of 
those hypotheses.   
H1: The more publicness a university exhibits, the less efficient the university will be with 
respect to producing postsecondary education. 
 
Four structural equation models using both a binary and continuous measure for 
publicness as well as an index and component-based controls for quality provide support at a 
99% level of statistical significance that there is a relationship between publicness and 
efficiency.  Examining 230 national universities in the United States, the primary model 
indicated a small effect size of 0.232 between publicness and efficiency.  The direction of the 
relationship was consistent with the hypothesis, meaning that as a university became more 
public, it expended more dollars per degree awarded, even after accounting for the effects of 
quality. 
H2: The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through competition 
for students.  Managers at public universities will perceive less competition for students 
than will managers at private universities.  
 
The quantitative data analyzed do not provide sufficient evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  Two of the structural equation models indicated a very weak positive relationship 
and two indicated a very weak negative relationship.  Two models indicated a statistically 
significant relationship, but two others indicated the effect size was not statistically significant. 
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H3:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through competition 
for students.  The more competition a university faces for students, the more efficient the 
university will be.     
 
The quantitative data analyzed do not provide sufficient evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  Two of the structural equation models indicated a very weak positive relationship 
and two indicated a very weak negative relationship.  Two models indicated a statistically 
significant relationship at 95% confidence, but one indicated the effect size was not statistically 
significant. 
  
H4:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through personal 
motivation for efficiency.  Managers at public universities will be less motivated to make 
the university operate more efficiently than will be managers at private universities.       
 
After performing ten semi-structured in depth interviews with five private university 
administrators and five public university administrators, no evidence was found to support this 
hypothesis.  Neither private nor public university administrators were aware of any incentives 
offered by their universities to behave in efficient ways.   
H5:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through personal 
motivation for efficiency.  The more managers are motivated to increase efficiency, the 
more efficient the university will be.       
 
There is not sufficient data to provide evidence for this hypothesis.  More variability is 
needed in terms of the incentive structure facing managers before meaningful comparisons may 
be made.   
 
H6:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through bureaucratic 
motivation for inefficiency.  Managers at public universities will perceive more 
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency than will managers at private universities. 
 
The qualitative interviews do provide some evidence that managers at public universities 
are more aware of the perverse budgetary influences on university efficiency.  A clear pattern 
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emerged among public university interview subjects concerning the "use it or lose it," nature of 
budgeted funds, where no such pattern emerged for private university interview subjects.   
 
H7:  The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through bureaucratic 
motivation for inefficiency.  The more managers perceive bureaucratic motivation for 
inefficiency, the less efficient the university will be.  
 
The combination of the qualitative interviews and the quantitative analysis provides some 
evidence that this might be the case.  The combination of evidence from H1 and H6 implies that 
budgetary incentives may be the mechanism through which publicness impacts inefficiency. 
IV.2 Limitations 
Like all research, the current study makes deliberate choices about what research 
questions to answer, and what methods to use to answer those questions.  In making these 
choices, limitations on the research are introduced.   
With regard to the quantitative analysis, some data points are missing or appear to be 
reported in an inconsistent manner in the IPEDS database.  The overall number of missing data 
points was less than 1%.  Unfortunately, IPEDS represents the best available source of secondary 
comparative data available to researchers interested in examining postsecondary education in the 
United States. 
Also with respect to the quantitative analysis, not every national university in the United 
States was analyzed.  This is, again, partly due to data limitations, but was also partially a 
conscious choice based on marginal returns to collecting additional data.  Some of the smaller 
national universities do not report data consistently to IPEDS, and/or do not contain a score on 
the U.S. News and World Report index, and therefore would not have a quality control value for 
two of the structural models.   
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Because the measure for efficiency is constructed so broadly, and also because the 
national universities examined are geographically and structurally diverse, the research may not 
uncover meaningful data trends at a regional or other sub-national levels, or for specific subsets 
of efficiency.   
With respect to the qualitative interviews, time and resource constraints, primarily time 
constraints of the interview subjects, prevented detailed follow-up conversations to further 
explore emerging trends.  Also, data was collected, transcribed, and coded by a single researcher, 
so it is subject to bias or error introduction.  To guard against these errors, voice recognition 
software was used to assist with transcription, and a standardized script was used for all 
interview subjects.   
IV.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
The current research provides evidence to support the popular notion that private 
producers are more efficient in production than are public producers.  The quantitative analysis is 
strong evidence in terms of internal validity within the context of national universities, and the 
results are likely generalizable to other types of universities in the United States.   
Importantly, the research also clarifies that competition is not always the mediating 
mechanism for differences in efficiency between the public and private sector.  This highlights a 
boundary condition of the X-Inefficiency theory, which is that its explanatory power only holds 
if there is direct competition in the market between producers.   
The research indicates that private and public national universities in the United States 
are likely competing for different pools of students based on quality.  It may also be the case that 
universities are competing for students on the basis of qualities other than efficiency.  In either 
case, because the universities are not directly competing for the same students, the level of 
  65 
 
competition they face is not a good explanation The research also provides some evidence to 
support that Niskanen's budget-maximizing theory has validity in the context of postsecondary 
education in U.S. national universities.   
IV.4 Contributions to Practice 
As with all engaged scholarship research, the aim of this study is not only to contribute to 
academic knowledge, but also to make meaningful contributions to practice as well (Van de Ven 
2007).  In terms of practical advice to public university administrators, the research highlights 
three important areas. 
Firstly, there is room for public university administrators to improve the efficiency of 
their universities without sacrificing quality.  The experience of private universities provides 
evidence that this is possible.  Improving efficiency, while perhaps not a primary goal for the 
university, should be considered as part of an overall strategic mission.  Increasing efficiency can 
translate into keeping tuition costs as low as possible, and maintaining access to higher education 
for a broader segment of society.  This will become increasingly important for public universities 
as state appropriations are reduced in the face of tight fiscal constraints. 
Both public and private universities would benefit from a focus on defining, measuring, 
and understanding efficiency from the point of view of the university.  Administrators are not at 
all familiar with thinking in these terms.  Before any improvement can be made, efficiency must 
be measured in a meaningful way and administrators must think in terms of how their actions 
impact efficiency. 
Public universities in particular should re-examine the ways in which they allocate budget 
across the university.  De-centralized budgeting with little or no cross-subsidization through 
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indirect cost allocation can act as a moderating influence on administrators' budget-maximizing 
actions.  This, in turn, may lead to greater efficiency for the university. 
IV.5 Public Policy Recommendations 
Policy makers might consider some recommendations based in part on the findings of 
this research.  Firstly, there is a need for more consistent and reliable reporting from universities 
in the United States.  While the IPEDS database and mandatory federal reporting tied to receipt 
of federal dollars has helped, there is great room for improvement.  The data collection and 
reporting mechanisms in place in the United Kingdom are perhaps considered burdensome by 
universities, but they provide a much richer base of data from which to conduct meaningful 
research.   
More generally, policy makers must consider larger questions such as, what is the 
appropriate role of postsecondary educational institutions in the United States.  Clearly, increases 
in tuition are unsustainable at current rates, and act as a threat to affordability and accessibility 
for large segments of the population.  The need for efficiency must not dominate public policy so 
as to become the primary reason for education at the expense of quality, but its importance must 
be recognized in terms of preserving accessibility.  Instituting standardized measures and 
reporting requirements for efficiency may aid in bringing attention to efficiency as a component 
of overall success in delivering postsecondary education. 
Finally, to stimulate measurement and achievement of efficiency in institutions of higher 
education, policy makers should consider incentivizing efficiency at the university level to 
encourage universities to focus on efficiency at sub-university levels.  Beyond requiring 
measurement of efficiency, tying financial incentives such as faster access to Pell Grant award 
funds or other federal money to success on well thought out efficiency measures may provide 
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impetus to universities to perform well on those measures.  This should be balanced against 
maximizing other objects such as quality and accessibility.   
IV.6 Future Research 
Future research is needed to further explore these findings.  Time series data should be 
examined to understand the impacts to efficiency over time as universities become more or less 
public to confirm whether the findings hold over time as opposed to a point in time.  More 
focused, comparative research should be conducted with respect to differences between drivers 
of efficiency for public universities and driver of efficiency for private universities.  Researchers 
should also focus on differing analyses between undergraduate and graduate education.  Finally, 
future researchers might consider using alternative outcome and efficiency measures such as 
numbers of patents to determine if different universities are perhaps trying to maximize different 
outcomes.   
Additional data is needed to explore the incentive and budget-maximizing findings.  
Specifically, researchers should focus on collecting survey data from a wider sample of national 
universities, and administer those surveys to the highest levels of university governance.  By 
collecting a larger sample, it will become possible to test hypotheses related to incentives and 
budget-maximizing by means of quantitative analysis as opposed to qualitative analysis only. 
Finally, analysis should be done on alternative types of universities such as regional 
universities to test the external validity of these results.  More analysis can be done in terms of 
sub-sets of universities from different areas, or with different missions. Future researchers may 
also choose to focus on the distinction between size and publicness of a university by examining 
cross-sectional data on large private institutions and small public institutions.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: National Universities Analyzed 
 RECORD 
NUMBER 
UNIVERSITY NAME TYPE INEFFICIENCY PUBLIC
NESS 
QUALITY 
001 Princeton University Private $588,555 7% 100 
002 Harvard University Private $409,061 10% 98 
003 University of Chicago Private $389,780 19% 96 
004 Yale University Private $619,381 11% 96 
005 Columbia University Private $249,770 18% 95 
006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Private $862,917 30% 95 
007 Stanford University Private $799,678 24% 95 
008 University of Pennsylvania Private $358,767 22% 93 
009 Duke University Private $463,776 22% 92 
010 California Institute of Technology Private $1,090,404 54% 91 
011 Dartmouth College Private $435,269 13% 90 
012 Johns Hopkins University Private $493,811 30% 90 
013 Northwestern University Private $282,943 20% 90 
014 Brown University Private $302,899 16% 86 
015 Cornell University Private $242,690 18% 86 
016 Rice University Private $276,233 14% 86 
017 Vanderbilt University Private $507,507 40% 86 
018 University of Notre Dame Private $225,109 6% 85 
019 Washington University in St. Louis Private $574,746 17% 85 
020 Georgetown University Private $203,162 10% 80 
021 Emory University Private $369,231 32% 78 
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022 University of California-Berkeley Public $218,706 40% 78 
023 University of California-Los Angeles Public $331,697 34% 78 
024 University of Southern California Private $221,562 16% 78 
025 Carnegie Mellon University Private $225,071 19% 76 
026 University of Virginia Public $183,959 22% 76 
027 Wake Forest University Private $473,702 16% 75 
028 University of Michigan-Ann Arbor Public $213,603 36% 74 
029 Tufts University Private $216,881 16% 72 
030 New York University Private $273,271 11% 71 
031 University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill Public $283,658 57% 71 
032 Boston College Private $150,805 5% 70 
033 College of William and Mary Public $126,407 30% 70 
034 Brandeis University Private $128,916 14% 68 
035 Georgia Institute of Technology Public $243,287 53% 68 
036 University of Rochester Private $266,049 31% 68 
037 Boston University Private $146,467 15% 67 
038 Case Western Reserve University Private $294,497 38% 67 
039 University of California-Santa Barbara Public $138,396 45% 67 
040 Northeastern University Private $112,713 10% 66 
041 Tulane University Private $142,229 21% 66 
042 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Private $210,657 20% 65 
043 University of California-Irvine Public $165,147 40% 65 
044 University of California-San Diego Public $324,224 46% 65 
045 University of Florida Public $192,393 43% 65 
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046 Lehigh University Private $170,959 11% 64 
047 Pepperdine University Private $117,491 1% 64 
048 University of California-Davis Public $236,949 48% 64 
049 University of Miami Private $367,678 25% 64 
050 University of Wisconsin-Madison Public $246,469 39% 64 
051 Villanova University Private $107,497 2% 64 
052 Pennsylvania State University-University 
Park Public 
$174,909 
17% 63 
053 University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign Public $171,505 33% 63 
054 Ohio State University-Columbus Public $163,510 37% 62 
055 University of Georgia Public $102,368 46% 62 
056 George Washington University Private $157,765 14% 61 
057 Purdue University-West Lafayette Public $135,384 36% 61 
058 University of Connecticut Public $178,901 49% 61 
059 University of Texas-Austin Public $145,795 34% 61 
060 University of Washington Public $221,973 42% 61 
061 Brigham Young University-Provo Private $108,408 2% 60 
062 Fordham University Private $99,579 3% 60 
063 Southern Methodist University Private $130,889 5% 60 
064 Syracuse University Private $107,912 9% 60 
065 University of Maryland-College Park Public $156,090 57% 60 
066 Worcester Polytechnic Institute Private $198,405 14% 60 
067 Clemson University Public $134,110 36% 59 
068 University of Pittsburgh Public $183,807 38% 58 
069 American University Private $120,643 4% 57 
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070 Rutgers University-New Brunswick Public $169,983 54% 57 
071 Stevens Institute of Technology Private $81,877 16% 57 
072 Texas A&M University-College Station Public $200,246 38% 57 
073 University of Minnesota-Twin Cities Public $193,238 45% 57 
074 Virginia Tech Public $133,166 46% 57 
075 Baylor University Private $129,902  56 
076 Colorado School of Mines Public $143,144 25% 56 
077 University of Massachusetts-Amherst Public $112,425 47% 56 
078 Miami University-Oxford Public $84,627 17% 55 
079 Texas Christian University Private $110,668 2% 55 
080 University of Iowa Public $187,092 40% 55 
081 Clark University Private $78,804 4% 54 
082 Florida State University Public $81,277 64% 54 
083 Michigan State University Public $156,047 31% 54 
084 North Carolina State University-Raleigh Public $144,473 55% 54 
085 University of California-Santa Cruz Public $121,909 61% 54 
086 University of Delaware Public $139,748 16% 54 
087 Binghamton University-SUNY Public $86,085 57% 53 
088 University of Denver Private $93,479 5% 53 
089 University of Tulsa Private $160,324 3% 53 
090 Indiana University-Bloomington Public $124,287 29% 52 
091 Marquette University Private $111,616 4% 52 
092 University of Colorado-Boulder Public $167,202 36% 52 
093 University of San Diego Private $106,141 4% 52 
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094 Drexel University Private $109,480 9% 51 
095 Saint Louis University Private $123,934 8% 51 
096 Yeshiva University Private $213,134 48% 51 
097 Rochester Institute of Technology Private $125,091 7% 50 
098 Stony Brook University-SUNY Public $159,792 65% 50 
099 SUNY College of Environmental Science 
and Forestry 
Public $151,484 73% 50 
100 University at Buffalo-SUNY Public $415,352 63% 50 
101 University of Oklahoma Public $147,079 41% 50 
102 University of Vermont Public $210,980 31% 50 
103 Auburn University Public $129,369 38% 49 
104 Illinois Institute of Technology Private $99,237 20% 49 
105 Loyola University Chicago Private $111,469 9% 49 
106 University of New Hampshire Public $109,434 34% 49 
107 University of Oregon Public $104,050 27% 49 
108 University of South Carolina Public $102,699 37% 49 
109 University of Tennessee Public $151,568 54% 49 
110 Howard University Private $217,726 15% 48 
111 University of Alabama Public $96,692 30% 48 
112 University of San Francisco Private $100,723 1% 48 
113 University of the Pacific Private $139,421 4% 48 
114 University of Utah Public $235,688 39% 48 
115 Arizona State University-Tempe Public $86,983 37% 47 
116 Iowa State University Public $131,758 44% 47 
117 Temple University Public $134,638 14% 47 
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118 University of Kansas Public $164,324 42% 47 
119 University of St. Thomas Private $82,041 1% 47 
120 The Catholic University of America Private $116,023 11% 46 
121 DePaul University Private $78,965 4% 46 
122 Duquesne University Private $86,921 4% 46 
123 University of Missouri Public $107,145 41% 46 
124 Clarkson University Private $110,482 12% 45 
125 Colorado State University Public $145,122 37% 45 
126 Michigan Technological University Public $135,165 39% 45 
127 Seton Hall University Private $100,810 4% 45 
128 University of Arizona Public $173,917 37% 45 
129 University of California-Riverside Public $138,961 46% 45 
130 University of Dayton Private $119,818 25% 45 
131 University of Nebraska-Lincoln Public $187,543 47% 45 
132 Hofstra University Private $119,513 7% 44 
133 Louisiana State University-Baton Rouge Public $162,598 41% 43 
134 Mercer University Private $85,085 13% 43 
135 The New School Private $108,531 1% 43 
136 Rutgers University-Newark Public $122,208 41% 43 
137 University of Arkansas Public $116,078 48% 43 
138 University of Cincinnati Public $102,131 33% 43 
139 University of Kentucky Public $205,501 47% 43 
140 George Mason University Public $91,128 38% 42 
141 New Jersey Institute of Technology Public $141,770 51% 42 
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142 San Diego State University Public $65,500 47% 42 
143 University of South Florida Public $97,872 57% 42 
144 Washington State University Public $130,276 49% 42 
145 Kansas State University Public $148,085 39% 41 
146 Oregon State University  Public $136,107 35% 41 
147 St. John Fisher College Private $68,347 2% 41 
148 University of Illinois-Chicago Public $237,494 28% 41 
149 University of Mississippi Public $142,781 49% 41 
150 University of Texas-Dallas Public $98,110 29% 41 
151 Adelphi University Private $77,383 2% 40 
152 Florida Institute of Technology Private $91,798 7% 40 
153 Ohio University Public $67,958 34% 40 
154 Seattle Pacific University Private $57,835 2% 40 
155 University at Albany-SUNY Public $113,724 70% 40 
156 Oklahoma State University Public $115,956 49% 39 
157 University of Massachusetts-Lowell Public $114,401 40% 39 
158 University of Rhode Island Public $103,515 37% 39 
159 Biola University Private $98,935 1% 38 
160 Illinois State University Public $99,066 23% 38 
161 University of Alabama-Birmingham Public $286,291 65% 38 
162 University of Hawaii-Manoa Public $185,990 71% 38 
163 University of La Verne Private $38,492 1% 38 
164 University of Maryland-Baltimore County Public $109,039 55% 38 
165 Immaculata University Private $54,846 2% 37 
 75 
166 Maryville University of St. Louis Private $46,123 1% 37 
167 Missouri University of Science & 
Technology Public 
$89,169 
40% 37 
168 St. John's University Private $126,580 2% 37 
169 University of California-Merced Public $220,828 54% 37 
170 University of Louisville Public $208,256 38% 37 
171 Mississippi State University  Public $151,217 55% 36 
172 Rowan University Public $169,448 44% 36 
173 University of Central Florida Public $64,571 61% 36 
174 University of Idaho Public $148,723 60% 36 
175 Virginia Commonwealth University Public $118,900 55% 36 
176 Kent State University Public $66,925 36% 35 
177 Robert Morris University Private $70,736 3% 35 
178 Texas Tech University Public $104,217 17% 35 
179 Union University Private $41,776 0% 35 
180 University of Hartford Private $74,773 4% 35 
181 Edgewood College Private $70,550 2% 34 
182 Lesley University Private $74,692 3% 34 
183 Lipscomb University Private $76,506 1% 34 
184 Suffolk University Private $82,750 2% 34 
185 University of Maine Public $169,365 49% 34 
186 University of Wyoming Public $166,651 65% 34 
187 Azusa Pacific University Private $72,324 0% 33 
188 Ball State University Public $82,178 43% 33 
189 Montclair State University Public $76,688 36% 33 
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190 Pace University Private $91,240 3% 33 
191 West Virginia University Public $125,773 37% 33 
192 Andrews University Private $96,002 4% 32 
193 Indiana University-Purdue University-
Indianapolis 
Public $146,680 39% 32 
194 University of Houston Public $113,176 26% 32 
195 University of New Mexico Public $203,417 51% 32 
196 University of North Dakota Public $135,330 38% 32 
197 Widener University Private $93,255 3% 32 
198 New Mexico State University Public $129,051 52% 31 
199 North Dakota State University Public $134,187 44% 31 
200 Nova Southeastern University Private $83,305 5% 31 
201 University of North Carolina-Charlotte Public $69,271 58% 31 
202 Bowling Green State University Public $72,925 37% 30 
203 California State University-Fullerton Public $65,890 58% 30 
204 Dallas Baptist University Private $73,770 1% 30 
205 University of Massachusetts-Boston Public $121,396 42% 30 
206 University of Nevada-Reno Public $148,574 53% 30 
207 Central Michigan University Public $67,073 31% 29 
208 East Carolina University Public $98,193 62% 29 
209 Florida A&M University Public $104,689 71% 29 
210 Montana State University Public $141,154 44% 29 
211 University of Alaska-Fairbanks Public $343,343 67% 29 
212 University of Colorado-Denver Public $283,016 40% 29 
213 University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth Public $104,244 48% 29 
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214 University of Montana Public $92,193 46% 29 
215 Western Michigan University Public $100,474 32% 29 
216 Florida International University Public $78,818 53% 28 
217 Louisiana Tech University Public $87,622 35% 28 
218 South Dakota State University Public $113,788 42% 28 
219 Southern Illinois University-Carbondale Public $146,210 34% 28 
220 University of Alabama-Huntsville Public $169,964 67% 28 
221 University of Missouri-Kansas City Public $115,902 38% 28 
222 Utah State University Public $114,120 63% 28 
223 Ashland University Private $76,642 0% 27 
224 Benedictine University Private $43,301 17% 27 
225 California State University-Fresno Public $76,247 65% 27 
226 Gardner-Webb University Private $47,892 3% 27 
227 Georgia State University Public $84,282 46% 27 
228 Shenandoah University Private $68,730 3% 27 
229 University of South Dakota Public $97,503 43% 27 
230 Wayne State University Public $147,894 43% 27 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
This guide is for semi-structured interviews, administered either in person or over the 
telephone and lasting between 30 and 60 minutes.  The role of the interviewer is to put the 
respondent at ease, and to gently re-direct the conversation if it drifts into unproductive areas.  
Aside from these restrictions, the respondent may speak freely about the concepts they feel are 
most important.   
1. Tell me a little about yourself and your role at the university. 
2. I am interested in the efficiency of universities.  By efficiency, I mean the cost the 
university incurs per degree awarded.  Can you talk a little bit about the relative 
importance of efficiency at your university?  Is it a major focus, an interesting metric, 
or something that is mostly ignored? 
3. Tell me a little bit about your own personal motivation to increase efficiency.  If the 
university were to become more efficient, would that translate into personal gain for 
you?  If the university were to reward you personally for increases in efficiency, what 
types of rewards would you consider motivating? 
4. Tell me a little bit about the way in which the university allocates budgetary resources.  
Are there aspects of the budgeting process which either encourage or discourage people 
from acting in an efficient way?  Specifically, what happens to a budgetary unit if they 
spend less or more than their allocated budget in each year? 
5. Tell me a little bit about alternative academic calendars, or alternative methods of 
course delivery such as online learning.  Are those practiced at your university?  Do 
you feel that non-traditional course delivery may translate to reduced quality of the 
educational experience? 
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6. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about efficiency at your university?  
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Appendix C: PLS-SEM Model 1 
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Appendix D: PLS-SEM Model 2 
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Appendix E: PLS-SEM Model 3 
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Appendix F: PLS-SEM Model 4 
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Appendix G: Regression for H1 and H3 
 
  
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.719924301        
R Square 0.518291        
Adjusted R Square 0.511868213        
Standard Error 92618.87834        
Observations 229        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 3 2.07668E+12 6.92228E+11 80.69565853 1.78572E-35    
Residual 225 1.93011E+12 8578256625      
Total 228 4.00679E+12          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept -140,129 22507.3459 
-
6.225920664 2.31971E-09 
-
184481.1018 -95776.7981 
-
184481.1018 -95776.7981 
Publicness 1,535 312.7990976 4.908045822 1.76588E-06 918.8418537 2151.622754 918.8418537 2151.622754 
Competition 629 459.6059085 1.369562664 0.172188791 
-
276.2234848 1535.14167 
-
276.2234848 1535.14167 
Quality 4,668 584.7879652 7.982546743 7.30564E-14 3515.735512 5820.459022 3515.735512 5820.459022 
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Appendix H: Regression for H2  
 
 
 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.813256757        
R Square 0.661386553        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.658389974        
Standard Error 13.40478012        
Observations 229        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 2 79319.32106 39659.66053 220.7138587 7.18745E-54    
Residual 226 40609.51737 179.68813      
Total 228 119928.8384          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 
-
8.043484398 3.213259307 
-
2.503216713 0.01301425 
-
14.37526405 
-
1.711704743 
-
14.37526405 
-
1.711704743 
Publicness 
-
0.011646793 0.045264952 
-
0.257302665 0.797179249 
-
0.100842116 0.077548531 
-
0.100842116 0.077548531 
Quality 1.026717197 0.049989944 20.5384746 1.36706E-53 0.9282112 1.125223194 0.9282112 1.125223194 
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